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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MOJAVE URANIUM COMP ANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

- vs. -

Case No.

11286

MESA PETROLEUM COMP ANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Mojave Uranium Company against Mesa Petroleum Company, the successor
in interest to Standard Gilsonite Company, upon a contractual agreement between Mojave and Standard. The
agreement consists of an unsecured obligation in the
amount of $20,000.00 for the release of an earlier claim
Mojave asserted against Standard which was secured
by a second mortgage upon personality of Standard.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court, upon hearing reciprocal motions for
summary judgment, denied that of Mojave's and granted
Mesa's upon the grounds that Mojave's claim was "barred
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mesa Petroleum Company seeks an affirmance of
its Summary Judgment since as a matter of law, Appellant's claim is barred.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as stated
by Appellant, however, Respondent feels that some pertinent facts have not been stated and further desires to
correct certain erroneous conclusions which have been
stated as fact.
Sometime during the period of 1957-1961 Mojave allegedly loaned (R. 1) to Standard certain sums of money
which was uncertain both as to the amount and as to
the source of the funds so loaned. (Depo. 43 & 45) At
any rate, Mojave held a second mortgage on certain
personal property of Standard which bears the date of
March 2, 1960. (Ex. P-17) Standard became financially
distressed during 1960-1962 and was constantly beseiged
by suits, demands of creditors and repossessions. (Depo.

5, 16 & 17)
A closer examination must be given to the origin
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of the agreement reached between the parties which
constitutes exhibit P-6 and P-7. Mr. Robert J. Pinder,
past president of Standard and close relative of the officers of Mojave, represented Mojave in the negotiations
which culminated in the agreement. ( Depo. 6, 11, 16, 38,
39) These alleged loans were made during the period
of Pinder's presidency. The corporate entity of Mojave
is and was of serious doubt, having had its charter revoked by Nevada and having failed to qualify to do business in Utah. (R. 5, 6, 7; Depo. 46) Further, there
was serious question as to the validity of the alleged
loans. (Depo. 40, 41, 43, 44, 45) Because of these questionable aspects of the Mojave claim, together with the
fact that the security was either nonexistent, dissipated
or worthless (Depo. 17, 19, 40, 41) and the additional
threat of a Chapter X proceeding (Ex. P-6), Mojave
desired to become an unsecured creditor. The sole consideration given to Standard for this privilege was the
release of the worthless security. (Depo. 41)
A close examination must be given the financial balance sheets to which the Appellant places great weight.
These balance sheets were prepared under extremely
difficult circumstances and reflect almost in total the
unverified recollections of Pinder. (Depo. 6, 11, 16, 17,
38, 39) Disputes and questions were raised on a number
of the claims including that of Mojave's. (Depo. 43, 45,
46) No documentation other than the balance sheets
of Standard has been discovered verifying the alleged
loan or loans between .Mojave and Standard. Mr. Bruce
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Coke, Counsel for Standard at the time of the Chapter
XI proceedings, informed the accountants who prepared
the financial sheets for Standard of the serious questions regarding the validity of the Mojave claim (Depa.
43, 44, 45), and stated that he specifically recalls informing the accountants that the principals of Standard had
reservations regarding the Mojave claim. (Depo. 45)
This same question of validity was conveyed to Mesa.
(Depo. 29)
POINT I
CONFIRMATION OF STANDARD'S PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT DISCHARGED MOJAVE'S CLAIM.

The Chandler Act, which was passed in 1938 and
is the present day statutory provision relating to Bankruptcy, gives broad relief for financially distressed businesses by means of composition and/or extension of
'Unsecured obligations. The Chandler Act affords relief
that could not and cannot be obtained at common law.
Chapter XI proceedings under the 1938 Act are set forth
in detail, together with the effects of these proceedings,
in United States Code, Title 11, Section 701 et al.
Basically, there are two routes a petitioner under
Chapter XI can elect to take with respect to unsecured
obligations: (1) a plan can be merely an "extension of
time" within which to pay creditors, or (2) a plan can
be a "composition," provided certain conditions are met,
which satisfies and pays in full the unsecured obligations.
together with contingent unsecured obligations of anY
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secured creditors which may arise after exhaustion of
the security.
Standard, predecessor of Respondent, chose the latter route, seeking a composition of the unsecured creditors. On May 25, 1962 Standard filed a direct petition
under Section 322 of the Chandler Act. A proposed plan
of composition was submitted on June 12, 1962, and
subsequently on August 13, 1962 an Order of Confirmation of the plan was granted by the Referee in Bankruptcy.
An agreement was consummated between Mojave
and Standard wherein Appellant became an unsecured
creditor in the amount of $20,000. The formal agreement
was executed sometime in June 1962. (Ex. P-6 & P-7)
The sole consideration for this agreement was the release
of the security. (Depo. 41) Appellant was aware of the
Chapter XI proceedings, and knew of the legal consequences following the release. Appellant could either
release the worthless and non-existent security, or face
proceedings under Chapter X of the Chandler Act. (Ex.
P-6 & P-7) There is no argument that at this date
Appellant did in fact release its security.
The real question before this Court is what effect,
if any, did the confirmation of Standard's Chapter XI
proceedings have upon the agreement of June, 1962
which placed Mojave in the status of an unsecured
creditod The language of the Act itself answers this
decisive question.
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SECTION 307:
"(l) "creditors shall include the holders of all
unsecured debts, demands or claims of whatever character against a debtor .... "
SECTION 308:
"A creditor shall be deemed to be "affected" by
an arrangement only if his interest shall be materially and adversely affected thereby."
SECTION 367:
"Upon confirmation of an arrangement (1) the arrangement and its provisions shall
be binding upon the debtor, upon any person
issuing securities or acquiring property under the arrangement and upon all creditors
of the debtor, whether or not they are affected
by the arrangement, or have accepted it or
have filed their claims, and whether or not
their claims have been scheduled or allowed
and are allowable;" (emphasis added)

SECTION 371:
"The confirmation of an arrangement shall discharge a debtor from all his unsecured debts and
liabilities provided for by the arrangement." (emphasis added)

It is upon confirmation that the rights of the parties are
crystallized and become fixed under the clear and concise language of the Statute. Confirmation was realized
on August 13, 1962, well after Mojave became an unsecured creditor. Mojave, being an imsecitred creditor
of Standard's upon confirmation, was and is bound by
that Order.
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Appellant would have this Court believe that the
critical time is the date of filing of the original petition.
'rhat date is important only to determine whether Mojave was in fact a creditor per se. Appellant cites a
very old case decided under a completely different Act
as the controlling case law. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S.
625, 33 S. Ct. 365, 57 L. Ed. G7G (1913) actually interpreted the 1898 Act. 1'he present day provisions of the
Chandler Act is decisive that "upon confirmation ... "
the rights of the parties are determined and bound. In
Gerson v. Booth Lumber Company, 230 F.2d 631 (1955)
which was decided after passage of the Chandler Act,
Justice Fee of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
at page 633:
''It is correct to say that a plan of arrangement
is not binding on the debtor or the creditors of
the debtor 1mtil it has been confirmd by the order
of the Referee."' (emphasis added)

Congress gave further expression to the importance
of the binding effect of the arrangement upon unsecured
creditors which are unsec11red on the critical date of
confirmation in Section 381. This provision refers to
proceedings wherein bankruptcy in the usual sense becomes necessary after a confirmation has failed and the
debtor is adjudged a bankrupt. This generally occurs
when the terms of the arrangement have been breached
or become impossible. It then becomes necessary to
provide for the unsecured obligations incurred after the
confirmation. Section 381 states:
"vVlwre, aftPr tlw confirmation of an arrange-
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ment, the court shall enter an order directing
that bankruptcy be proceeded with ...
(1) the unsecured debts incurred by the debt.
or after the confirmation of the arrangement
and before the date of the entry of the final
order directing that bankruptcy be proceeded
with shall, unless and except as otherwise provided in the arrangement or in the order
confirming the arrangement, share on a parity with the prior unsecured debts of the same
classes, provable in the ensuing bankruptcy
proceeding, and for such purpose the prior
unsecured debts shall be deemed to be reduced to the amounts respectively provided
for them in the arrangement, less any payment made thereunder;"
Obviously there is no need to provide for a creditor
who was unsecured at the time of confirmation since
Congress had already provided that they would be bound
upon confirmation.

Collier's Bankruptcy Manital, Second Edition, edited
by Edelman and as revised by William T. Laube and
W. J. Hill (1968) pages 1098-1099 states:
"An arrangement becomes effective only iipon
confirmation by the Court." (emphasis added)

Confirmation is the vital and key step which hinds
and discharges all unsecured obligations. The import·
ance of the confirmation is expressed in In Re Graco, Inc.,
366 F2d 257 (1966) at page 260 as follows:

"It is clear that the determination of the referee

is not supposed to be a perfunctory one, and th.e
fact that the plan has been accepted by a reqUJ·
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site majority of creditors does not dispense with
the need for the referee to exercise his 'own independent judgment.'" (citations omitted)
The recent case of Poly Inditstries, Inc. vs. Mozley,
:102 F.2d 453 ( 1966) gives a clear and decisive ruling of
the Chandler Act. The court states, at page 456:
" ... the confinnation of a Chapter XI arrangement acts the same as a discharge in bankruptcy

"

The obligation to Mojave, if any, upon confirmation was discharged by the terms and conditions of the
arrangement. On August 13, 1962 the rights of the parties were fixed and became binding upon Mojave as well
as the other general unsecured creditors.
Appellant would have us believe that since no specific reference to the Mojave debt appears in the Order
of Confirmation and the Arrangement that under Section
371, the obligation to Mojave, if any, was not barred
or satisfied. However, as Exhibit P-3 shows, the plan
is for "all unsecured general claims." This provision
applies to Appellant. It is well established that the scope
of Section 361 is sweeping and the term "all unsecured
general claims" is broad enough to include Appellant.

In speaking of the provisions of Section 367 ( 1),

Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Edition, Volume 9, Section
9.25 (5), page 340-341 states:

wrhat reference to creditors is a sweeping one. It
is not essential to confirmation that an arrangement be accepted by all creditors, but creditors
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who have not accepted the arrangement as well
as creditors who have accepted it are bound
upon confirmation. A creditor cann~t escape the
effect. of an arrang~ment by not filing a proof
of claim; such a creditor, as well as creditors who
have filed their claims, is bound upon confirmation. Nor is it material whether a creditor's
claim has been scheduled, or is allowed, or is
even allowable, or whether the creditor is affected
by the arrangement. That creditor is nevertheless bound by the arrangement and its provisions
upon confirmation. Even if an unscheduled creditor did not know of the proceeding, he is bound
upon confirmation. Even if a creditor is affected
by the arrangement, and it makes no provision
for him, so that he could have successfully op·
posed its confirmation, he is nevertheless bound
by the arrangement and its provisions upon con·
firmation."

It is apparent from the foregoing that Appellant
is bound upon confirmation to the provisions of the ar·
rangement. On August 13, 1962, Appellant was an wnsecured creditor, who had actual notice of the proceedings (see Exhibit P-6), who could have availed itself of
the same provisions which were applicable to all general
unsecured creditors. The release was given under the
guise of benefiting Standard, when in fact Mojave knew
that the alleged security was dissipated, non-existent and
worthless. In addition there was serious doubt whether
there was ever any obligation due Mojave. Mojave saw
an opportunity to trade an absolutely worthless and
questionable claim into an unsecured claim. It did so
and should be held to the effect of that transaction.
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The arrangement provided all unsecured creditors with
equal rights to share in a distribution approved by a
majority of the creditors which is binding upon all wnsecured creditors upon confirmation.
The fact that the appellant neither filed its claim,
nor participated in the distribution is immaterial. Mojave
cannot be permitted to have the benefit of its bargain,
or what was bargained for on its behalf by the other
unsecured creditors, and later say it didn't mean to be
bound as an unsecured creditor. The ramifications of
the release were known to both Standard and Mojave,
and the law is unequivocal that upon confirmation the
parties are bound.
Section 357 of the Chandler Act provides:
"An arrangement made within the meaning of
this Chapter may include (1) provisions for treatment of unsecured
debts on a parity one with the other, ... "
In effect, Mojave is now before this Court seeking a better and more desirable position than other general unsecured creditors. Appellant would seek to negate the
proceedings insofar as they apply to it based on the
release of the worthless security and its failure to participate in the distribution under the plan.
Zavelo v. Reeves, supra, is not the controlling case
a::; Appellant would have us believe. Zavelo, a 1913 case,
\\as decided by a Court interpreting .the provisions of
the Act of Julv 1, 1898, Chapter 54i, 30 Stat. L. 544,
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which had a total of two sections relating to compositions (to be distinguished from corporate arrangements).
These two sections were codified as sections 12 and 13
of Chapter 3 of the 1898 Act. The only pertinent provisions was section 12 ( e) wherein it was stated:
"(e) Upon the confirmation of a composition, the
consideration shall be distributed as the judge
shall direct, and the case dismissed. Wherever a
composition is not confirmed, the estate shall be
administered in bankruptcy as herein provided."
Under the old 1898 Act, a petitioner in bankruptcy
could offe,r a composition to his creditors and, if accepted, would not be formally adjudicated a bankrupt.
He could pay to his creditors the compromised amount
and the case against him would be dismissed. All of this
was changed by the Chandler Act of 1938. The 1938
Act, together with its amendments, specify in detail the
remedies and relief available to a financially distressed
corporation under Chapter XI, as well as Chapter X.
Contrast the two meager provisions of the 1898 Act
with the 100 sections contained in Chapter XI alone. It
is the provisions of the Chandler Act of 1938 and its
subsequent amendments that are controlling of this con·
troversy. It is upon confirmation that unsecured credi·
tors are bound. It is the sweeping and broad provisions
of the Chandler Act which state clearly and concisely
that the alleged Mojave debt is barred.
The next two cases are illustrative of the vast dif·
f erences between the 1898 Act and the Chandler Act.
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The Court in In Re Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400 (1933) at page
401 stated:
"In the usual proceedings, the debtor is adjudicated a bankrupt, and divested of his property.
But, where the proceedings result in the confirmation of an offer of composition, the case is
dismissed, even though the debtor has not yet
been adjudicated a bankrupt. (citations omitted)
The debtor is reinvested with all of his property
except such as may have been deposited with the
court to secure performance of the composition."
Contrast K orbluth with the current, clear, and unambiguous language of Section 367 and the judicial
pronouncement in In Re Vulcan & Reiter Co., 162 F.2d
92 (1947), a per curiam decision, which is indicative of
the provisions of Chapter XI. At page 94 it states:

" ... It makes no difference that petitioner did
not actually consent to the composition, the consent of the majority in number and amount of
creditors has the same legal effect as actual consent by petitioner. Creditors, including petitioner,
having received what they bargained for or what
was bargained for in their behalf as the case may
be, have no further claim to receive the balance
of their original claims from any source." (Court's
emphasis)
Another very recent case expressive of the new
provisions dealing with this particular issue is Frey v.
Prankle, 361 F.2d, 437 (1966), decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 15, 1966, (rehearing
denied June 17, 1966). In that case discussions were held
between Frey, who was then president of the corporation
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which had filed Chapter XI proceedings, and Frankle,
the successor in interest under the proceedings, wherein
Frey was to be given an option to purchase one-third of
the new stock which was to be issued, together with a
five-year contract of employment with the reorganized
corporation at a salary of $2,000.00 per month. This
plan was rejected by the creditors and not approved,
and a subsequent plan which did not contain these provisions desired by Frey was approved. The Court states
(at page 442) through Justice Pickett:
"The parties are substantially in agreement that
from the beginning of the negotiations between
Frankle and Frey, it was contemplated that Frey
would be employed by the reorganized corporation and would have an option to acquire sufficient shares to assure him one-third interest in
the controlling stock. These contemplated provisions were submitted to and considered by a committee representing the creditors of the corporation, and were not included in the plan which
was submitted to the Court for approval. Although Frey, in his first cause of action, alleged
that his employment and stock purchase option
should have been included in the plan, it was not,
and when the order of confirmation became final,
the rights of the party were fixed as of its entry.
(citations omitted) ·when the plan became effective, Frey's position with the corporation was
terminated, and he had no legal right to employment." (emphasis added).
'l_1he

Frey case, supra, illustrates two vital points

applicable to our controversy. First, the court reaffirmed
the clear language of the statutes by emphasizing that

15
the rights of the parties were fixed when the order of
confirmation became final. Secondly, the negotiations
spoken of between the parties were after the original
petition was filed, but prior to the confirmation. The
plan became effective and Frey no longer had any rights
even though the newly organized corporation retained
Frey some six months after the confirmation at $2,000.00
per month.
The case of Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally
& Company, 195 F. Supp. 621 (1961) controls the issues
before this Court. Wise filed its petition under Chapter
XI on November 16, 1955. Rand filed a proof of claim
May 23, 1956 as a secured creditor. Wise objected to
Rand's claim on several grounds. Finally on July 27,
1956 a stipulation was entered into wherein one-half of
Rand's claim became unsecured and the remaining onehalf was secured. At pages 623 and 624 of the Reporter
it states:
"This was followed by the filing, in the arrangement proceeding, of a stipulation between the
parties, dated July 27, 1956, which fixed the value
of the 13,915 copies held by Rand at $10,017.59,
one-half the indebtedness admitted by Wise. In
its capacity as unsecured creditor, Rand accepted
Plaintiff's plan of arrangement which was affirmed on August 2, 1956. The sum of $10,017.59
was allowed Rand as an unsecured claim for which
it might receive payments under the plan."
The confirmation was August 2, 1956, after the stipulation which made Rand an unsecured creditor. The arrangement was binding upon Rand.
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Respondent submits that the clear and decisive language of the Chandler Act, together with the recent cases
under its provisions of Frey v. Frankle, supra; In Re
Vulcan, supra; Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally &
Company, supra; and Gerson v. Booth Lumber Company,
supra, controls the subject matter of this action and
should be decisive in upholding the lower Court.
POINT II
MOJAVE'S DEBT WAS NOT REVIVED.

Appellants' contention is totally incorrect that the
written promise to pay the sum of $20,000 for the release
of the Appellants' secured position constitutes a revival
or reaffirmation which survives the Chapter XI proceedings. It is this very accord and satisfaction, or secondary
agreement, or novation, or whatever one labels it, that
is barred and satisfied under the Chapter XI proceedings.
In Poly Industries, Inc. vs. 1110.zley, 362 F.2d 453
(1966) the Court at page 456 stated with clarity the
effect of the confirmation as follows:
" ... the effect of Section 371 is to . . . provide
that . . . the confirmation of a Chapter XI arrangement acts the same as a discharge is bankruptcy ... "
It is this discharge in bankruptcy, effective itpon confirmation, that is a bar to Mojave's unsccitred claim.

Mojave being represented by Pinder in the negotiations with Standard, knew that the security was in
fact worthless. Mojave made the decision to abandon
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the worthless and non-existent security to better itself
at the expense of other parity unsecured creditors. The
very purpose of the Chapter XI proceedings, and one of
the fundamental requirements by legislative command~
is that the arrangement before being confirmed be made
in good faith and for equal protection to creditors of
the same class. Mojave desired to be an unsecured
creditor because of the inadequacy of the security. The
sole consideration for the agreement on the part of Standard was to obtain a release of the security. Mojave
reaped the benefit of its bargain and now after the
passage of five years desires to be relieved of that bargain. Mojave's insistence of additional considerations
outside of the Chapter XI proceedings would wreck havoc
with the provisions of res adjudicata of the clear and
unambiguous language of the Chandler Act of 1938
where in Section 371 states :

"The confirmation of an arrangement shall discharge a debtor from all of his unsecured debts
and liabilities provided for by the arrangement

"

As was stated in Frey vs. Frankel, supra, at page 442,
" ... when the order of confirmation became final,
the rights of the parties were fixed as of its
entry."
Standard's Order of Confirmation became final by
its own terms on the 7th day of September, 1962. It is
res adjudicata to the rights of Mojave and Standard.
No application has been timely filed under Section 386
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to set aside or modify the arrangement. To allow Mojave
to usurp to a higher and more preferred position by
its own self dealing on dubious claims is to thwart
completely the language of the present day law and the
case law which is decisive of the issue before the Court.
POINT III
THE THEORY OF APPELLANTS IS AT VARIAN CE
WITH ITS THEORY BELOW, HOWEVER, MESA DID NOT
CREATE A THIRD P ARY BENEFICIARY CONTRACT IN
THE SO-CALLED ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT.

Appellant's claim, according to the pleadings and
counsel's argument (R. 76 and top of 77) is an action
based on simple contract for loans allegedly made to
Standard. All of the proceedings in the lower court
were in accord with this theory.
Pursuant to Motion of Appellant dated March 25,
1968, Appellant was granted leave to amend its Complaint. (R. 49) At this time Appellant had at its disposal the records and files of Respondent, Bruce Coke's
deposition, and had in fact concluded its discovery. No
further discovery by either party was made from and
after March 25, 1968. The Amended Complaint filed
March 25, 1968 (R. 46-48) does not set out any different
theory for relief than the original Complaint except that
it pleads the written agreement between the parties.
Mojave made its Motion for Summary Judgment on
April 10, 1968. (R. 52) Argument before the lower court
was recorded at request of counsel for appellant. (R. 6789)

It is very evident that the only theory argued by
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counsel is the direct contract of Mojave and Standard.
But now, Appellants assert an entirely different theory:
A third party beneficiary contract between Mesa and
Standard for the benefit of Mojave, which is raised by
Appellant for the first time on appeal. (App. Brf. 14-20)
A new theory may not be raised upon appeal, Twenty
Second Corp. Etc. v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.,
36 Utah 238, 103 Pac. 243 (1909); In re Reason's Estate,
49 Utah 24, 161 Pac. 678 (1916); Evans v. Shand, 74 Utah
451, 280 Pac. 239 (1929); Fisher v. Bank of Spanish Fork,
93 Utah 514, 74 P.2d 659 (1937); Upton v. Heiselt, 118
Utah 573, 223 P.2d 428 (1950). In the Evans case, this
Court stated at 240 Pac.:
"The rule is well settled that on an appeal the
parties are restricted to the theory on which the
case was prosecuted or defended in the court
below which on appeal must be adhered to and
cannot be shifted. * * * Whatever liberality may
be accorded procedure, there nevertheless are
certain fundamental principles which cannot be
disregarded. These, among others, are that pleadings are the judicial means to invest the court
with subject-matter jurisdiction and to limit issues
and to narrow proofs; that courts cannot make a
complaint for one thing stand for a different
thing; that recovery must be secundum allegata
et probata, which is but a necessary deduction
from the maxim that what is not judicially presented cannot be judicially decided; that the statement of the cause of action or ground of defense
as laid binds the court as well as the parties ; and
that there must be no departure is but another
statement of the maxim that it is vain to prove
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what is not alleged. These principles are primary.
(Citations omitted).
This Court stated in Pettingill v.s. Perkins, 2 Utah 266,
272 P.2d 185 (1954) at pages 186 and 187 of the Pacific
Reporter:
"Generally, appellate courts will not review a
ground of objection not urged at trial court....
Having by his own pleadings, evidence, and instruction tried and rested . . . upon the theory
that the mother's negligence would bar the father,
he is bound thereby, as the law of the case. He
cannot now on appeal shift his theory and position." (Citations omitted).
Appellant now suddenly on appeal shifts its theory
of recovery to that of a third party beneficiary contract
which theory has not been plead nor argued. Appellant
is bound under its theory of moneys due under an alleged
loan to Standard; they have no standing to urge upon
this court a completely different theory now.
Sound reason and logic lies behind this Court's
refusal to allow Appellant to switch theorjes at the
appeal stage. First, no ruling has been made based on
the new theory upon which an appeal can be taken.
Secondly, the Respondent has had no opportunity to
establish and present to the Court any defense or defenses it may have to the new theory.
The mischief is evident in this instance because the
agreement between Mesa and Standard has never been
introduced into evidence. It is this third party contract
which the Appellant is desirous of this Court to rule
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upon, yet it is conspicuous by its absence. No merger
agreement, unless specifically spelled out, grants any
creditor or group of creditors a different claim than
that which existed prior to the merger. Yet Appellant,
in its new theory would have this Court impose a "shedding" of valid and substantial defenses. Appellant would
have this Court interpret an agTeement which is not even
part of the record and impose liability on Respondent,
while denying Respondent the benefits of the assets obtained for assuming those liabilities.
Assuming arguendo that the new theory is properly
before this Court, it is insufficient to establish liability.
Mesa in the merger agreement now stands in the shoes
of Standard in respect to the defenses as well as the
liabilities. Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-71 not
only allows, but asserts without qualification, that Mesa's
assertion of the bar in bankruptcy is proper. It states:
"When such merger or consolidation has been
effected:

• • • •

( d) Such surv1vmg or new corporation shall
thereupon and thereafter possess all the
rights, privileges, immunities ... of each of the
merging or consolidating corporation(s) . . . "
(emphasis added)
The "Agreement of Purchase and Sale and Plan of
Reorganization" dated July 6, 1965, between Standard
and Mesa, while its absence from the record is indicative
that this new theory was never considered by the lower
Court, by its very terms and conditions is not a third
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party beneficiary contract. It is a simple merger agreement wherein Mesa became Standard. Whatever defense
or defenses Standard could assert against Mojave, Mesa
could and can now assert. Mesa has in fact asserted these
defenses. No objection was expressed by Mojave in the
lower Court to these def ens es. Mesa, in the lower Court,
argued the discharge in Bankruptcy. This in effect is
Standard's defense. The record below is silent of any
objection to this defense and Mojave never challenged
it as being inapplicable.
Reason and logic would further dictate that Appellant's theory is incorrect. The conclusion reached by
Appellant would allow all of the creditors of Standard
to assert a third party beneficiary contract and completely negate the Chapter XI proceedings and the clear,
unequivocal provisions of the Chandler Act as enunciated
by Congress. This conclusion is intolerable. The only
logical conclusion one can reach about the effect of
the merger agreement is that Mesa is Standard. In
becoming Standard, Mesa did not benefit any third party,
but simply stepped into the shoes of Standard and would
be answerable, as Standard would have been, to that
third party. The bar in bankruptcy is a right, privilege

and immunity which Mesa acquired from Standard in
the merger. The entire record below dealt with the contractual obligation of Standard to Mojave, if any, and
the defense of the Chapter XI proceedings to that obligation.

1
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CONCLUSION
The lower Court was correct in granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The uncontroverted facts place Appellant as an unsecured creditor
upon the date of confirmation. Mojave released their
security to become an unsecured creditor knowing of
the Chapter XI proceedings. Mojave simply placed itself
in a better position by trading an extremely dubious
claim with equally dubious security, for an unsecured
position in the hope of receiving payment. When Mojave
learned of the merger into Mesa, it withheld filing its
claim in the bankruptcy proceedng and ultimately brought
this action.
The decisive provisions of the Chandler Act, and
the cases cited to the Court heretofore, dispel any doubt
whatsoever that as a matter of law, Respondent was and
is entitled to a Summary Judgment.
Appellant's new theory is not controlling for the
reasons that it was never raised at the lower Court, and
further that the Merger Agreement granted Respondent
all of the defenses available to Standard, one of which
is the Chapter XI proceedings. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that this Court affirm the decision of the
Respectfully submitted,
lower Court.
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